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Abstract
We model a three-pillar pension system and analyse the impact of exogenous shocks on
an open economy, using an overlapping generation model where individuals live for two
periods.  The  three-pillar  pension  system  consists  of  (1)  a  PAYG  pension  system,  (2)  a
defined benefits pension fund, and (3) private savings. The economy is exposed to an
ageing trend, inflation and a stock market crash. We show that in the three-pillar pension
system the impact of these shocks on the economy is mitigated when compared to a two-
pillar system, since each shock has a different impact on the three pillars. In order to
illustrate the working of the model with respect to the impact of shocks, both in
magnitude  and  the  development  over  time,  we  provide  simulation  results  for  the
Netherlands.
1 Corresponding author: Tel: 0031 643029504; Email address: C.Du@maastrichtuniversity.nl
21.  Introduction
In order to elaborate the distinct functions that pensions have in a macro- and
microeconomic context, the World Bank (1994) has introduced a three-pillar system to
classify existing pension systems. In a macroeconomic context it is widely recognised
that first pillar state pensions, financed on a pay-as-you-go basis, help in providing basic
old-age benefits and are not very vulnerable to inflation. However, the second and third
pillars, financed by collective and individual savings, respectively, supposedly provide a
better solution in an ageing society, but are susceptible to inflationary and asset price
developments.
In  this  paper  we  analyse  how the  three  pillars  relate  to  different  exogenous  (economic)
shocks. Indeed, the current financial crisis has affected second and third pillar pensions
markedly, triggering a discussion on the viability of the three pillars under different
economic  circumstances.  Some  have  argued  that  the  design  of  the  pillars  should  be
changed as to allow one pillar to act as a stabilising element when other pillars are
affected by shocks, as these shocks have a distinct bearing on the pillars concerned (De
Kam, et al., 2007).
Literature is rather abundant with respect to the analysis of shocks in a two-pillar pension
system defined by a two-pillar with PAYG pensions and private savings. Most analyses
use an OLG model in a closed economy context, although Henin and Weitzenblum (2005)
assess the macroeconomic and welfare effects of pension reforms in an open economy.
For instance, De?er (2008) investigates the effect of a replacement ratio shock, Fanti and
Gori (2008) study the effects of increasing longevity and Heer and Irmen (2009)
elaborate the effects of a declining labor force on economic growth, pensions and welfare
for the US in an economy where the production technology is endogenous. Rahman
(2008) analyses implications of demographic uncertainty under a two-pillar system with
PAYG pensions and personal savings and a two-pillar system consisting of fully-funded
pensions and personal savings in the context of a closed economy. Groezen, Meijdam and
Verbon (2007) investigate the impact of reducing benefits of a PAYG-scheme and ageing
3in a two-sector (commodity and service) economy. Kemmerling and Neugart (2009)
analyse the influence of financial market lobbies on pension policies.
In this paper, on the contrary, we analyse the impacts of shocks under a three-pillar
pension system. The aim of our paper is to demonstrate the advantage of risk
diversification under a three-pillar pension system in response to exogenous shocks,
when compared to a one-pillar or two-pillar pension system. Our focus is quite different
compared to previous literature on three-pillar systems.
Draper, Knaap and Westerhout (2003) develop the GAMMA model with a three-pillar
pension system which reflects the situation of the Netherlands quite well but it is too
complex to derive tractable solutions. Their aim is to evaluate the effects of four shocks
(a decrease in interest rate, a decline in wage growth, a stock market crash and an
increase in life expectancy) on the welfare of different generations under different types
of funded pension systems. Draper and Armstrong (2007) use the GAMMA model for
projections  and  simulations  of  the  outcomes  of  demographic  shocks,  tax  system reform
and pension system reform under a three-pillar pension system in an open economy. In a
similar vein Benkovskis (2006) models the effect of increasing the fully funded pillar’s
share and the retirement age on Latvian total saving and their components in a small open
economy. Verbic (2007) analyses  the welfare effects and macroeconomic effects of an
increase in the age of retirement and a lower level of ambition with respect to the
indexation of pensions to wages using the SIOLG 2.0 model (a dynamic overlapping-
generations general equilibrium model of the Slovenian economy).
Bovenberg and Uhlig (2006) use an OLG model to derive the social planner’s solution to
optimal intergenerational risk sharing and redistribution between old, young and future
generations.  In  the  decentralised  economy  they  do  not  present  an  analytical  solution  of
consumption and savings, but explore how to use lump-sum transfers to realise the social
planner’s solution. Bonenkamp and Westerhout (2010) adopt a relatively simple OLG
model to derive analytically that the welfare gains from intergenerational risk sharing
dominate the welfare losses from the labor market distortions in the collective funded
pension schemes. As their focus is on the advantage of the collective funded pension
schemes,  they  do  not  consider  the  public  PAYG  pension  scheme  in  their  model.  Broer
4(2010) mentions that the PAYG pension scheme and funded pension scheme expose
individuals to different kind of risks. But his paper focuses on the distributions of these
risks and how the pension returns are associated with the risks.
The  paper  is  organised  as  follows.  In  Section  2  our  model  of  an  open  economy,
consisting of two overlapping generations with a three-pillar pension system, is presented.
Section 3 presents the steady state solution of the model and analyses the impact of
different  exogenous  shocks.  In  particular,  the  impact  of  a  shock  in  returns  on  financial
assets (bonds and equity) is considered, as well as a change in the participation rate, the
actual inflation rate, population growth, the survival rate and the impact of the division of
the contribution to the pension fund between the firms and the workers. Section 4
presents  a  calibration  of  the  model,  based  on  data  for  The  Netherlands.  Moreover,  the
impact of three shocks is simulated, i.e. a demographic shock, an inflation shock as well
as a drop in equity return comparable to the 2008 financial crisis. Section 5 concludes.
2.  The model
The model consists of firms, consumers in two overlapping generations, a public sector
and a pension fund. Firms operate under full competition and maximise profits. The
inputs are labour and capital. The return on capital is exogenously given, assuming a
small  open  economy.  The  wage  costs  are  the  sum of  the  wage  received  by  the  workers
and the pension premium paid by the firm.
Consumers live two periods. In the first period, individuals supply labour and earn a
wage  income  at  an  exogenous  participation  rate.  In  the  second  period,  only  part  of  the
individuals survive. The survivors are retired and receive pensions from the public sector
(first pillar) and the pension fund (second pillar). Consumers aim to maximise their
lifetime utility by choosing savings in the first period (third pillar). They invest their
savings in bonds only.
5The public sector taxes the workers in order to pay public pensions proportional to the
current wage rate to all retired individuals. The public pension scheme is of the PAYG
type.
The pension fund receives contributions from the firms and the workers, and pays
pensions proportional to the previous wage rate to the retired workers. The pension fund
invests in equities and the workers are obliged to participate in the fund. Since the
pension benefits are not directly related to asset market rates of return, shocks to the
pension wealth are absorbed by the contribution rate (except under extreme situations).
2.1 Firms
Firms use labour tL and capital tK  to produce output tY , according to a Cobb-Douglas
production function:
aa -= 1tttt LKAY (1)
Here tA measures the productivity level, which grows at a rate g .
Firm behaviour is based on profit maximisation. This yields:
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Real wage cost ctw  consist of the real wage tw , received by the workers, and the share b
)10( ££ b of the real pension premium ptt , which is paid by the employer. We assume a
small open economy, which implies that the real rate of capital return is determined on
the world market – hence ktr  is given. Finally employment tL is equal to the exogenous
participation of the young individuals, tpN  – we elaborate the latter below.
6Equations (2) and (3) can be combined to yield an expression of the capital stock and the
wage rate in terms of exogenous variables:
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2.2 Consumers
We assume an overlapping generation model with two generations: young and old. There
are tN young individuals, who participate in the labour market at a rate p ( 10 £< p ).
The growth rate of tN is n . All participating young individuals earn a real wage income
tw , from which they contribute to the public sector benefits and the pension fund at rates
g
tt and
p
ttb )1( - , respectively. Net income then is spent on consumption and savings. The
savings are invested in bonds.
Only a fraction e  of young individuals survives to the next period. During that period the
individuals are old and at the end of that period they die. An increase in the fraction e
then can be used to mimic the process of ageing. When old, the individuals do not work,
but receive a public pension gth and a pension
p
th  from the pension fund.
2 Moreover, they
use  the  returns  on  their  savings,  as  well  as  the  savings  themselves,  to  finance
consumption in retirement. The individuals therefore face the following real budget
constraints in their two periods of life:
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2 Actually, only those who have worked when young receive a pension, but in our aggregate analysis we
take that into account by including the participation rate in equation (8) below.
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e
tp is the expected inflation rate and tp is the actual inflation rate. Because only a fraction
e  of individuals survives to the next period, the assets of those who deceased fall to
surviving contemporaries. The total real return on savings then is 11 -+
e
lt .
The pension from the pension fund is a fraction px of  the  past  wage.  It  should  also  be
corrected for the participation rate in the young period, to allow for consumption by all
old consumers (including those who did not fully participate when young). Moreover, the
pension fund fully compensates the effect of inflation on the pension.  Thus we find:
t
pp
t pwxh =+1 (8)
The public pension is a fraction gx of the current wage (in order to relate it to the wage in
the previous period we use the fact that the real wage grows with productivity growth g ),
hence:
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Given the budget constraints (6) and (7), the individuals maximise their expected lifetime
utility represented by
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where g  measures the rate of time preference of the individual and 0/1 >q is the
elasticity of intertemporal substitution. Maximising equation (10) subject to the budget
constraints results in the following first-order condition
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Combing equations (6) and (7) with equation (11) gives the following individual
consumption and saving functions:
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by equation (5).
2.3 The public sector
The public sector receives taxes from the workers for paying the pension benefits gt 1+h  to
the retirees according to equation (9).  The pension scheme is of a pay-as-you-go nature.
Hence, the real budget constraint of the public sector is given by:
111 )1( +++ += t
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Substituting equation (9) then yields:
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This shows that the premium decreases with population growth and the participation rate,
whereas it increases with ageing and a higher benefit.
92.4 The pension fund
The pension fund has real financial wealth ptW  at the start of a period, it receives
premium income t
p
t pwt  from firms and workers and pays pension benefits
p
th to retirees
according to equation (8). The fund invests all its assets in equity which yield an expected
real return tm , with
t
e
t
e
t
t
r
p
p
m
+
++
=+
1
)1)(1(
1 .  The  real  return  on  equity etr includes
anticipated price changes of equity, corrected for inflation.
Thus the pension fund real wealth accumulates according to:
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The pension fund wants to make the wealth equal to the liability – the latter equals
p
ttN he 1-  in the steady state. The pension fund will adjust its premium when the thus
accumulated wealth does not meet its target value, such that the wealth accumulation is
back to its target value in j/1 years. Hence:
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In the steady state, where the pension fund meets its liabilities, we have
p
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p
t NW he 1-=                                                                                                               (19)
Assuming that in that situation expected inflation also equals actual inflation we find for
the pension fund premium ptt from equations (8), (17) and (19):
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Equation (20) shows that in the steady state the premium decreases with higher returns on
equity and increases with ageing and a higher benefit.
In a situation where the pension fund does not meet its liabilities, we find combining
equations (17) and (18):
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This converges to the steady state premium (20) when the pension fund meets its
liabilities and expected inflation also equals actual inflation.
An interesting question arises when the equity return is risky, with an expected variance
of 2s . The expected value of the equity return tm is not affected, but because
)( 1
p
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t NW he -- depends on the actual equity return,
p
tt  is stochastic now. As a
consequence one can derive from equation (21) that the variance of ptt equals
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It is obvious that the larger the variance of the equity return the higher the variance of ptt .
2.5  The complete model
The complete model is given by equations (5), (12) – (14), (16) and in the steady state
equation (20). Assuming the steady state, we also have btt r=l . When we assume all rates
of return, as well as the participation rate, to be constant over time, the model can be
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solved in a straightforward way. We elaborate this in the steady state solution in Section
3. This also allows us to analyse the impact of shocks to economy in a comparative static
context. To consider the properties of the model during the transition period in response
to shocks we have to resort to simulations, since the dynamics of the model then become
intractable analytically. The simulation results are presented in Section 4.
3.  The steady state
In Section 3.1 we solve the model for the steady state. In the steady state, actual inflation
equals expected inflation and the financial wealth of the pension fund is equal to its
liabilities in every period. In Section 3.2 we investigate the comparative statics properties
of the model by analysing the impact of exogenous shocks on the steady state solution.
3.1 The steady state solution
From the presentation of the model in the previous section it follows directly that the
steady state is characterised by the following equations:3
yc = wL (23)
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3 We omit the time subscript of each variable, since it is not relevant in the steady-state.
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The variables on the left-hand side of equations (23) – (28) are the endogenous variables
and the other variables keb rrr ,, and p are exogenous.
From equations (27) and (28) one sees that the “return” on the PAYG premium is given
by (29a),4 while in a normal situation the “return” on the pension premium is given by
equation (29b). Finally we know from the discussion on consumer behaviour that the
return on savings is given by (29c):
1)1)(1(1)1( -++=-+
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The return on pension funds therefore is larger than that on public pensions as long as
pgnr e )1)(1(1 ++>+ , and it exceeds that on private savings as long as be rr > . By
having a pension system which consists of three pillars, the pension is essentially spread
over a portfolio with different rates of return, as equation (29) illustrates. One hedges
against inflation and asset price risk by using a PAYG system, one hedges against
demographic risk by using a pension fund, and one allows for individual risk preferences
by using private savings next to a pension fund. 5  Therefore the three-pillar system
mitigates the impact of different types of shocks. We elaborate that point in the next
section where we present simulation results. But first we analyse the impact of different
types of shocks in the steady state.
3.2   The impact of exogenous shocks on the steady state
4 Individuals pay wgt in the young period and receive )1( gwg +x in the old period. Therefore, the return
on the PAYG premium is given by equation (29a)
5 One might argue that actually the pension fund should be the safe investor, and private pensions then
should allow for more risk-taking behaviour (Muysken, 2010), but that does not represent the current
situation.
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The impact of shocks to pension benefits, returns of bonds and equity, the inflation rate,
the participation rate, the survival rate and population growth on the endogenous
variables of the model is summarised in Table 1.6 In order to compare our findings to the
results from other literature we discuss here the impact of a change in benefits for both
types of pensions. We elaborate on some more findings when we discuss the simulation
results presented in the next section.
The results of Table 1 indicate that in our model a decrease of the public pension benefits
leads  to  a  lower  PAYG-tax  rate,  while  the  pension  premium  does  not  change.  The
decrease of the benefits increases savings, which illustrates the substitutability of savings
for  pensions.  The  response  of  consumption  of  both  generations  depends  on  whether
)1( br+ > )1)(1( ng ++ , or not. The reason is that the lifetime income, out of which both
consumptions are financed, increases when the return on savings )1( br+ is higher than
the return on the public pension contribution )1)(1( ng ++ – compare equations (29a) and
(29c).7 In that case a decrease of the public pension leads to an increase of consumption
of both generations.
6In the appendix section 1 the derivations and resulting conditions underlying Table 1 are presented.
7 Because the participation rate is p , the return on the public pension contribution should be divided by p .
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Table 1 The impact of exogenous shocks on the economy
Premiums Consumption Savings
PAYG Pension Young Old
gt pt yc oc s
PAYG benefits gx + 0 -* -* -
Pension benefits px 0 + -** -** -
Employer contrib. b 0 0 ? ? ?
Inflation epp = 0 0 0 0 0
epp ¹ 0 + ? - -
Bonds returns br 0 0 -*** +*** +***
Equity returns er 0 - + + +
Participation rate p - 0 + + +
Population growth n - 0 + + +
Survival rate e + + - - -
* A sufficient condition is )1( br+ > )1)(1( ng ++
** A sufficient condition is )1(1
1 be rr +<
-
+
b
***  A sufficient condition is 11 >
q
This outcome of our model is consistent with the conclusions of a study of national
savings by Edwards(1996), who used a panel of 36 OECD, Latin American and East
Asian countries (but excluding the USA and UK) and of Kemmerling and Neugart (2009),
Henin and Weitzenblum (2005). Private savings were negatively related to the social
security spending. On the other hand, Groezen, Meijdam and Verbon (2007) concluded
that a decrease of the public pension decreases consumptions in both periods. However,
they analysed a closed two-sector economy with factor prices determined by the capital-
labor  ratio.  In  that  context  a  lower  PAYG-tax  rate  caused  by  a  decrease  of  the  public
pension implies a lower rate of return to savings and more expensive services when
retired. Then individuals have a strong incentive to save more to smooth consumptions in
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both  periods.  As  a  result,  they  increase  savings  more  than  the  rise  of  net  wage,  so  that
consumptions in both periods decrease eventually. Verbic (2007) found similar results as
our results when simulating the SIOLG 2.0 model.
From Table 1 one also sees that in our model a decrease of the benefits from the pension
fund causes a lower pension premium, while the PAYG-tax rate is not affected. Again the
decrease of the benefits increases savings, which illustrates the substitutability of savings
for pension benefits. This result is the same as in Draper and Armstrong (2007), in which
they simulated the effect of a smaller pension scheme. Also in accordance with their
findings, the response of the consumption of both generations is ambiguous. If
)1(
1
1 be rr +<
-
+
b
the response of consumption of both generations is negative. The reason
is that the lifetime income, out of which both consumptions are financed, decreases when
the return on savings )1( br+ is higher than the return on the pension premium
)1(
1
1 be rr +<
-
+
b
– compare equations (29b) and (29c).8 In this case a decrease of the
pension fund pension leads to an increase of consumption of both generations.
4. Simulations
In  this  section  we  use  simulations  to  analyse  the  dynamics  of  the  model.  We  focus  on
three shocks –an ageing population, inflation and a stock market crash – which represent
current economic (potential) problems. An interesting aspect of these shocks is that they
demonstrate  the  relative  strengths  and  weaknesses  of  both  pension  systems.  As  we
already mentioned in the introduction, first pillar state pensions, financed on a pay-as-
you-go basis, help in providing basic old-age benefits and are not very vulnerable to
inflation –see also equation (29a). However, the second and third pillars, financed by
collective and individual savings, respectively, supposedly provide a better solution in an
8 Individuals only pay part of the pension premium so the return on the pension premium should be divided
by )1( b- .
16
ageing society, but are susceptible to financial developments – see also equations (29b)
and (29c), respectively.
We discuss the simulation results below, but first we present the baseline simulation in
Section 4.1, based on parameter values which reflect the current state of the Dutch
economy. In Section 4.2 we then present the simulation results of an ageing population.
The simulation of an increase in the inflation rate are analysed in Section 4.3. Finally we
discuss the impact of a shock in the stock market in Section 4.4 and pay separate
attention to the impact of increased equity risk in section 4.5.
4.1  The base-line simulation
For simulation purposes we cannot use the model (21) – (26), which we used in the
previous section to derive the steady state results for two reasons. First, since we want to
analyse the dynamics after a shock we cannot assume that the pension fund always meets
its liabilities. Hence the pension premium will fluctuate to satisfy wealth adjustment of
the pension fund according to equation (21). Second, the model we used above is a
discrete two-period model which periods stressing over many years, say young persons
live 40 years and old persons live 20 years. The dynamics after a shock require, however,
that we use a continuous time model which allows us to simulate on a year-by-year basis.
For that reason we have used in the simulations a continuous time version of the model
developed in section 2 with a variable pension premium. This model is presented in the
Appendix section 2.
Most parameter values for the simulations are taken from the GAMMA model (CPB,
2007), which has been developed by the Central Planning Bureau to reflect the situation
in  the  Netherlands.  The  output  elasticity  of  capital  stems  from  Groezen,  Meijdam  and
Verbon (2007), while the initial productivity is chosen equal to unity for simplicity. The
real rate of return to capital is taken as the average of the corresponding rates for bonds
and equity. The ratio of the number of young to the number of old persons is around 2 for
the Netherlands. The PAYG and the pension fund benefits, as well as the part of the
17
pension premium paid by the firm, are chosen to reflect the Dutch situation. The resulting
parameter values are presented in Table 2.
Table 2 The parameters values used in the simulations
Intertemporal substitution elasticity  (1/?)* 0.5
Time preference ( r )*9 1.3%
Ratio of old to young** 0.5
Population growth rate ( n ) 0
Participation rate ( p )* 78%
Initial productivity (A) 1
Real productivity growth rate ( g )* 1.7%
Output elasticity of capital (a ) 0.3
Real return on bonds ( br )* 2%
Real return on equity ( er )* 3.5%
Real return on capital ( kr ) 2.75%
Inflation rate (p )* 2%
PAYG benefit ( gx )** 30%
Pension fund benefit ( px ) ** 50%
The part of the pension premium paid by the firm ( b ) 0.75
*  Source CPB (2007)
**Source Bonenkamp et al.(2010)
9 The rate of time preference of 1.3% implies that the discount factor g for different year equals
25
)013.01(
1 -
+
t
with 8525 ££ t , since individuals enter the economy at the age of 25 and die at 85.
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Using the values of the parameters from Table 2 we have calculated the steady state
values of the variables of our continuous time model. The resulting values of the PAYG
tax rate, the pension premium, the consumption of the young and the old and the savings
are presented in Table 3, where all values are expressed as a proportion of the wage the
workers receive. Mind that the pension premium is the total value paid by the worker and
the firm. The workers only need to pay ¼ of the total pension premium. The resulting
premiums of 15% for PAYG pensions and 12.68% for the pension funds are plausible
(Bonenkamp et al., 2010). Both the consumption of young and the savings reflect the
average of the young generation. The consumption of old reflects the average of the old
generation.
Table 3 Steady-state values of the variables, relative to wage
4.2 The ageing population
A disadvantage of a PAYG system (first pillar), as compared to pension funded by
collective and private savings (second and third pillars, respectively), is that the first
pillar is more vulnerable to the ageing problem – see also equation (29a). Since this
problem is hotly debated in many countries, we want to evaluate this point using our
model.
In our model ageing leads to a higher PAYG-tax rate as more old persons require the
public  sector  to  pay  benefits.  The  higher  tax  rate  leads  to  a  lower  lifetime  income  and
hence has a negative impact on consumption of both generations and on savings with
gt
(PAYG tax
rate)
pt
(pension
premium)
yc
(consumption of
young)
oc
(consumption of
old)
s
(savings)
0.15 0.1268 0.7725 0.6961 0.0545
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sensible values of parameters. Martins et al. (2005) concluded that the evolving
population structure could have a strong negative impact on household savings, partly
depending on the generosity and coverage of social systems – see also Masson and Tryon
(1990). Both findings support our conclusion.
In  our  simulation  we increase  the  ratio  of  the  old  to  the  young persons  from 0.5  to  0.6
over 5 years. Period 1 represents the initial steady state situation, whereas the ratio starts
to increase in period 2. In Figures 1 – 4 we present the reactions of the pension premiums,
consumption of the young, consumption of the old and savings, respectively. All
variables are expressed as a fraction of wage received when young. We compare the
results  of  a  simulation  of  a  system  with  and  without  a  pension  fund  (second  pillar),  to
show the impact of a PAYG scheme versus a funded scheme. In the situation without a
pension fund individuals do not pay a pension premium and receive the 80% of the wage
they earned from the PAYG scheme when old.
From Figure 1 one sees that in the baseline scenario the tax rate increases in line with the
ratio of old to young, as predicted by our model, while consumption of both generations
falls as can be seen in Figures 2 and 3.10 The absence of a pension fund, however,
requires a much higher tax rate from the PAYG system. And savings improve gradually
because of the lower consumption in the young period – see Figure 4. The reason is that
the return on the pension premium is higher than the return on the PAYG tax rate,
compare equations (29b) and (29a), respectively. As a consequence the responses of
consumption and savings are also larger in the case without the pension fund.
10 The steady state values of consumption of young and old and of savings are different under both schemes,
because in the base-line scenario we have 03,0=gx and 05,0=px , whereas under the alternative
scheme we have 08,0=gx . Therefore the levels of consumption and savings under both schemes are
different too. We correct for that by normalising the steady state levels of the alternative scheme to the
level of the base line scenario.
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        Figure 1 The adjustment path of Figure 2 The adjustment path of
 the PAYG-tax rate consumption of young
Figure 3 The adjustment path of Figure 4 The adjustment path of
consumption of old savings
According to the figures, we can conclude that the consumption of the young decreases
by 2% gradually and the consumption of the old decreases by 1% gradually. Bovenberg
and Uhlig (2006)  present similar results. They find a decrease in consumption of the
young varying from 0.85% to 7.95% with different values of parameters when the
longevity increases. Bonenkamp and Van de Ven (2006) find  a decrease in the welfare of
the young of 0.95% and a decrease in the welfare of the old varying from 0.03% to 2.6%
depending on the types of the pension scheme.11
11 Armstrong, Draper, Nibbelink and Westerhout (2007) suggest that private consumption increases from
45.8 billion of Euros to 55.1 billion of Euros when the old-age dependency ratio increases from 25% to
45%, and similar results are found in Draper and Armstrong (2007). This increase in the private
consumption is because of the higher proportion of retirees in population who consume more than they
produce  and because  of  fiscal  arrangements  such as  the  PAYG tax  rate.  Because  of  the  strong growth of
public pension government debt of the increases from 56.1% GDP to 211% GDP. In our analysis the
negative effect of the ageing is born by the individuals to prevent increasing government debt . As a
consequence consumption decreases.
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4.3  An increase in the inflation rate
A frequently mentioned advantage of a PAYG system, is that pensions funded by
collective and private savings are much more sensitive to inflation. This can be seen from
equation (29), where a shock in expected inflation will influence the returns on bonds and
equity – see equations (29b) and (29c), respectively. We want to evaluate this point using
our  model,  in  particular  since  inflation  might  be  a  serious  threat  in  the  aftermath  of  the
financial crisis. For that reason we model an unexpected increase in inflation to 4%, from
its initial level of 2%, while expected inflation gradually adjusts to 4% in 3 periods.
      Figure 5 The adjustment path of Figure 6 The adjustment path of
 the pension premium consumption of young
Figure 7 The adjustment path of                     Figure 8 The adjustment path of
            consumption of old saving
As we indicate in Table 1, anticipated changes in the inflation rate do not affect the
pension premium, the PAYG-tax rate, consumption of both generations and savings in
the steady state in our model. The reason is that the nominal returns on bonds and equity
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compensate the effect of inflation as long as expected inflation equals actual inflation.
However, if expected inflation is unequal to actual inflation after a shock, the actual
inflation  rate  will  affect  almost  all  variables  in  the  model.  The  PAYG-tax  rate  does  not
respond to inflation because the public sector collects the taxes to pay for the public
pensions in the same period – see also equation (29a). However, the inflation rate affects
the pension premium positively since the real return on equity will fall – see equation
(29b).
In  our  simulations  we  consider  both  the  base-line  situation  with  a  PAYG  pillar,  and  a
situation without a PAYG pillar, to show the impact of a PAYG scheme versus a funded
scheme.  In  the  situation  without  PAYG  benefits  individuals  do  not  pay  the  PAYG-tax
rate  and  receive  the  80%  of  the  wage  they  earned  from  the  pension  fund  when  old.  In
Figures 5, 6, 7 and 8 we present the reactions of the pension premiums, consumption of
the young, consumption of the old and savings, respectively. All variables are expressed
as a fraction of wage received when young. Period 1 represents the initial steady state
situation. Inflation increases to 4% in period 2 and remains at that level, while expected
inflation catches up gradually and reaches 4% from period 5 onwards.
From Figure 5 one sees that the inflation shock indeed has a positive impact on the
pension premium. Moreover, the impact is stronger in the absence of a PAYG pillar,
since the PAYG premium is not affected by inflation. From Figures 6 and 7 one sees that
in the steady state the negative response of consumption generations to the increase in
inflation lasts longer in the situation without a PAYG pillar, reflecting the absence of
inflation risk of that pillar.
It can be seen in Figure 6 that in the baseline simulation the consumption of young almost
returns to the original level after 5 years, while the consumption of young in the situation
without PAYG pillar gradually adjusts during 30 years. From Figure 7 one sees that the
effect on consumption of old is larger and lasts longer when the PAYG pillar is absent. In
that case the consumption of old decreases first because the members of the young
generation whose savings decrease most enter the old generation. Then when the young
members whose savings decrease less join the old, the consumption of old gradually
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returns. The base-line scenario can be explained by the same logic. There is an increase
in the consumption of old after the shock because the young members who have more
savings then enter the old generation – Figure 8 shows that in periods 4 and 5 savings are
higher than the initial level after the initial negative shock. To sum up, the simulation
results clearly show that consumption of both generations returns to its original level
more  quickly  in  the  situation  with  a  PAYG  scheme  than  in  the  situation  without.  This
illustrates that a PAYG scheme can have a stabilising effect in case of an inflationary
shock.
4.4  A fall in the stock market
A frequently mentioned advantage of a PAYG system, as compared to a pension funded
by collective savings, is that the latter are much more susceptible to stock market
fluctuations – compare also equations (29a) and (29b). This is in particular relevant in the
current situation of a financial crisis, where we witnessed strong fluctuations in the stock
market. We use our model to evaluate the impact of these fluctuations, and consider the
impact of a stock market crash, as we witnessed in 2008 in the Netherlands.  In response
to this unexpected shock, the pension fund will increase the pension premium.
We have simulated a shock in the stock market in period 2 which makes the pension fund
wealth fall by 15%, while the real return on equity permanently drops to 80% of its
steady state value. Figures 9 – 12 present the impact on the pension premium,
consumption of young, consumption of old and savings, expressed as a fraction of wage
received  when  young.  We  compare  the  results  of  a  simulation  of  a  system  with  and
without a PAYG pillar, to show the impact of a PAYG scheme versus a funded scheme.
In  the  situation  without  PAYG  benefits,  the  old  receive  80%  of  the  wage  they  earned
from the pension fund.
Figure 9 shows that in the baseline scenario the pension premium increases strongly as a
result of the shock, which seems plausible given the drop in pension wealth. This factor
contributes to a fall in consumption of young as can be seen from Figure 10. Although
the pension benefits are not affected by the stock market crash, the decrease in the
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consumption of the old follows from the lower savings – compare Figures 11 and 12. The
sharp decrease in savings observed in Figure 12 follows from the decline in life-time
income due to the stock market crash, while the young want to maintain a certain level of
consumption.
Figure 9 The adjustment path of              Figure 10 The adjustment path of
the pension premium                                      consumption of young
Figure 11 The adjustment path of Figure 12 The adjustment path of savings
consumption of old
One sees from Figures 10 and 11 that the response of consumption of both young and old
to the shock is larger in the situation without a PAYG pillar: Consumption in the
adjustment  periods  is  lower  in  that  situation  since  the  first  pillar  is  not  affected  by  the
shock in the stock market – see also equation (29a). This also illustrates the advantage of
a PAYG pillar under these circumstances. As can be seen from Figure 12, savings in the
situation without the PAYG pillar decrease more because of the larger effect of the stock
market crash.
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4.5   Equity risk
In previous simulations we did not consider equity risk. However, the actual equity return
is volatile. From equation (22) one sees that the variance of the equity return affects the
pension premium – the larger the variance of the equity return the higher the variance of
p
tt . Due to the impact of equity risk on the pension premium, both consumption and
savings will be affected. We illustrate this by simulating the impact of varying equity
return.
Let equity return follow a lognormal distribution (Draper and Westerhout, 2009). The
expected equity return is 3.5%. We draw 100 different stochastic paths and calculated the
expected developments for the equity return with a standard deviation equal to 0.025 and
0.05. 12  The five Figures below show the steady state path and the two expected
developments of the equity return, pension premium, consumption of young,
consumption of old and savings during 30 years.
In Figure 13 we can see that the time path of expected equity return is more volatile, the
higher the standard deviation of the equity return is. Consistent with equation (22) the
path of the pension premium then is more volatile too, as can be seen from Figure 14.
Comparing Figures 13 and 14 shows that when the equity return is higher than the equity
return in the steady state, the pension premium is lower than the one in the steady state.
This can be explained by the negative impact of the returns on pension wealth on the
pension premium – see also equation (21).
Savings are also more volatile when the standard deviation of the equity return is higher,
as is illustrated by Figure 15. Comparison of the latter with Figure 13 illustrates that the
relation between savings and equity returns is positive. As we mentioned above, young
12 The data downloaded from the database of CRSP is used to calculate the standard deviation of the stock
return each year from 1993 to 2009. According to the calculation the biggest standard deviation is 0.05 and
the smallest is 0.025.
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individuals pay a lower pension premium when equity return is higher, then they have
more left to save.13
 Figure 13 The adjustment path of     Figure 14 The adjustment path of
 equity return     the pension premium
 Figure 15 The adjustment path of savings         Figure 16 The adjustment path of
                   consumption of young
13 In our model we do not consider the possibility of risk aversion.
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  Figure 17 The adjustment path of
     consumption of old
From  Figure  16  one  sees  that  the  volatility  of  the  consumption  of   the  young  also  is
higher the larger  the standard deviation of the equity return, and the same phenomenon
can be observed for consumption of the old in Figure 17.The relation between the
consumption of the young and the old on the one hand, and equity return on the other is
less clear, however.
The latter can be explained as follows. Consumption is proportional to total wealth. Total
wealth  is  the  sum  of  the  financial  wealth  and  the  human  capital.For  the  young,  human
capital is the sum of the present value of after-pension premium wage in the young period
and  the  present  value  of  pensions  which  is  not  affected  by  equity  return.  However,  the
pension premium paid for the pension fund is affected by equity return as mentioned
above. Financial wealth is the savings accumulated in the previous periods, and equity
return has an effect on savings as explained already in Figure 15. Figure 16 represents the
average consumption of all 40 generations of young people. If the total wealth of a young
generation is larger than the total wealth of the corresponding young generation in the
steady state, consumption of young will increase. When more young generations have
larger total wealth, consumption of young increases more.
The developments in Figure 16 can be explained using this logic. For example, from year
5 to year 20,  consumption of young when the standard deviation is 0.05 is larger than
28
consumption of young in the steady state. During these years the increase in consumption
of young from the young generations who have larger total wealth dominates the
decrease in the consumption of young from the young generations who have smaller total
wealth, which can be checked in Figures 14 and 15. In these years, the pension premiums
are lower than the value in the steady state most of the time, which increases human
capital.  And  savings  are  higher  than  in  the  steady  state  in  most  years,  which  increases
financial wealth.
For the old, human capital is the present value of pensions which is not affected by equity
return.  Financial  wealth  is  accumulated  savings,  which  are  affected  by  equity  return  as
explained above. Figure 17 represents the average consumption of all 20 generations of
old persons. If accumulated savings of a recent old generation are larger than
accumulated  savings  of  a  recent  old  generation  in  the  steady  state,  consumption  of  old
will increase, assuming that the present value of the pension benefits is constant. When
more old generations have larger accumulated savings, consumption of old increases
more.  The developments presented in Figure 17 then can be explained. For example
from year 5 to year 20, consumption of old increases steadily when the standard deviation
is  0.05.  This  is  consistent  with  the  observation  from  Figure  15  that  all  recent  old
generations have larger accumulated savings than in the steady state.
In  summary,  we  find  that  higher  volatility  of  equity  returns  leads  to  more  volatile
consumption patterns of both generations and both the pensions and savings fluctuate in
line with equity returns.
5. Concluding remarks
In this paper we model a three-pillar pension system in a small open economy with two
overlapping generations. We examine how pension benefit ratios, returns on bonds and
equity, the participation rate, the population growth rate, the survival rate, the inflation
rate  and  the  division  of  the  pension  premium  between  firms  and  workers  affect  the
consumption of the young and the old, as well as savings, in the steady state.
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The model presented in this paper allows us to study the interaction of the three pillars
under different exogenous (economic) shocks. For this purpose, the impact of ageing,
inflation  and  a  stock  market  crash  has  been  simulated  for  the  case  of  The  Netherlands.
The simulation results clearly demonstrate that the existence of the three-pillar system,
notably the coexistence of a PAYG scheme and (private) pension savings, contributes to
risk diversification - positively affecting pension benefits and consumption under various
shocks. We show that the first pillar acts as a stabilising force in case of a stock market
crash and inflation, whereas stabilisation is provided by the second and third pillar when
the economy is affected by an ageing society.
Our  findings  also  put  the  conclusions  of  the Commissie Toekomstbestendigheid
Aanvullende Pensioenregelingen (2010) in perspective. It is true that the pension
premium is also affected by ageing of the population, but – overall – to a much lesser
extent than the PAYG tax rate. A substantial funded pension pillar is required, in
particular in an ageing society, to continue to be able to provide adequate pension
benefits. Scaling down funded pension schemes, as suggested by the Commissie, given
the expected increase in the pension premium, might in the medium to long term only
aggravate the problem.
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Appendix
I  Deviation of results in Table 1
In this part we presents details to clarify the roles of the public pension, the pension fund
pension,  the employer contribution to the pension premium, the inflation, the bonds
return, the equity return, the participation rate, the population growth rate and the survival
rate.
1.  The effects of the public pension
According to equations (27) and (28), we have that:
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Which show that the public pension has positive effect on the PAYG-tax rate and no
effect on the pension premium.
According to equations (23), (24) and (25), we have that:
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Which show that the effects of the public pension on the consumption in the young
period and the consumption in the old period depend on whether (1+ br )> (1+g)(1+n) or
not (1+ br )< (1+g)(1+n). If (1+ br ) > (1+g)(1+n), an increase in the public pension
decreases the consumption in the young period and the consumption in the old period.
The relation between the public pension and the saving is negative.
2. The effects of the pension fund pension
According to equations (27) and (28), the effects of the pension fund pension on the
PAYG-tax rate and on the pension premium are:
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Thus the pension fund pension does not affect the PAYG-tax rate and the effect of the
pension fund pension on the pension premium is positive.
According to equations (23), (24) and (25), the effects of the pension fund pension on the
consumption in the young period, the consumption in the old period and the saving are:
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Thus when )1( er+ < )1)(1( br+- b the effects of the pension fund pension on the
consumption in the young period and the consumption are negative. And the effect of the
pension fund pension on the saving is negative.
3. The effects of the employer contribution to the pension premium
According to equations (27) and (28), the effects of the employer contribution to the
PAYG-tax rate and on the pension premium are given by:
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Which show that the employer contribution to the pension premium has no effect on the
PAYG-tax rate and on the pension premium. According to equations (23), (24) and (25),
the effects of the employer contribution to the pension premium on the consumption in
the young period, on the consumption in the old period and the saving are given by:
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Thus the effects of the employer contribution to the pension premium on the
consumptions and savings cannot be derived explicitly.
4. The effects of the inflation
In order to identify the effect of the inflation ratep , we need to analyze it in two
situations. The first is the expected inflation ep is equal to the actual inflationp , which is
possible when the actual inflation rate is constant. The other is the actual inflationp
changes unexpectedly, which means the expected inflation ep is not equal to the actual
inflationp .
In the first situation, according to equations (23), (24), (25), (27) and (28), it is obvious
that when the expected inflation ep is equal to the actual inflationp , the inflation has no
effect on the consumptions, saving, PAYG-tax rate and pension premium.
When the actual inflationp changes unexpectedly, equations (23), (24), (25), (27) and (28)
are rewritten as:
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Differentiating equations (A19) and (A20) with respect to the actual inflation ratep :
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Differentiating equations (A16), (A17) and (A18) with respect to the actual inflation rate
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According to equation (A21), the PAYG-tax rate does not respond to the actual inflation
rate. The actual inflation rate affects the pension premium positively according to
equation (A22). And the effect of the actual inflation rate on the consumption in the
young period is ambiguous according to equation (A23). According to equations (A24)
and (A25), the effects of the actual inflation rate on the consumption in the old period and
the saving are negative.
5. The effects of the bonds return
According to equations (27) and (28), the effects of the bonds return on the PAYG-tax
rate and on the pension premium are given by:
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Which show that the bonds return has no effect on the PAYG-tax rate and on the pension
premium.
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According to equations (23), (24) and (25), the effects of the bonds return on the
consumption in the young period, on the consumption in the old period and the saving are
given by:
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Therefore, if 11 >
q
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s  and the effect of the bonds return on
the consumption in the young period is negative, the effects of the bonds return on the
consumption in the old period and the saving are positive.
6. The effects of the equity return
According to equations (27) and (28), the effects of the equity return on the PAYG-tax
rate and on the pension premium are found by evaluating the partial derivatives:
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Which show that the equity return does not affect the PAYG-tax rate and the equity
return affects the pension premium negatively.
According to equations (23), (24) and (25), the effects of the equity return on the
consumption in the young period, the consumption in the old period and the saving are
found by evaluating the partial derivatives:
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Which show that the consumption in the young period, the consumption in the old period
and the saving respond positively to the equity return.
7. The effects of the participation rate
Differentiating equations (27) and (28) with respect to the participation rate p :
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We can conclude that the participation rate has a negative effect on PAYG-tax rate  and
has no effect on the pension premium.
Differentiating equations (23), (24) and (25):
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Therefore, the effect of the participation rate on the consumptions and saving are positive.
8. The effects of the population growth rate
Differentiating equations (27) and (28) with respect to the population growth rate n :
0
)1( 2
<
+
-=
¶
¶
n
p
n
gg xet (A41)
0=
¶
¶
n
pt (A42)
Thus, the population growth rate has a negative impact on the PAYG-tax rate.
The population growth rate does not affect the pension premium.
Differentiating equations (23), (24) and (25) with respect to the population grow rate n :
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Thus, the population growth rate has positive impacts on the consumption in the young
period, the consumption in the old period and the saving.
9. The effects of the survival rate
Differentiating equations (27) and (28) with respect to the survival ratee :
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Which shows that the impacts of the survival rate on the PAYG-tax rate and on the
pension premium are both positive.
Differentiating equations (23), (24) and (25) with respect to the survival ratee :
=
¶
¶
e
yc
-
+++
¶
¶
--
¶
¶
-+
)1()]1([
])1()[1(
1
bb
pg
b
rr
pwr
qge
e
tb
e
t
+
+++
+++----++
2
1
1
)}1()]1([{
)1)](1([])1(1[)]1()[1(
bb
bgppgbb
rr
wrgppwrr
q
q
ge
xxtbtg
e¶
¶
L
w <0
43
(A48)
=
¶
¶
e
oc qg
1
)]1([ br+ -
+++
¶
¶
--
¶
¶
-+
)1()]1([
])1()[1(
{ 1
bb
pg
b
rr
pwr
qge
e
tb
e
t
+
+++
+++----++
2
1
1
)}1()]1([{
)1)](1([])1(1[)]1()[1(
bb
bgppgbb
rr
wrgppwrr
q
q
ge
xxtbtg 0} <
¶
¶
L
e
w
(A49)
e¶
¶s =
)1()]1([
)]1([])1(1[)]1([
1
1
bb
gppgb
rr
gppr
+++
++----+
q
q
ge
xxetbtge
e¶
¶w
+
+++
¶
¶
-+
¶
¶
+
-
)1()]1([
])1([)]1([
1
1
bb
pg
b
rr
pwr
q
q
ge
e
tb
e
tge
0
)}1()]1([{
)1)](1([])1(1[)]1()[1(
2
1
1
<
+++
+++----++
bb
bgppgbb
rr
wrgppwrr
q
q
ge
xxtbtg (A50)
Where =
¶
¶
e
w 0
1
<
¶
¶
+
-
e
t
bt
b p
p
w
Although the impacts of the survival rate on the consumptions and saving cannot be
derived explicitly but with sensible values of the parameters, the effects on the
consumptions and saving should be negative.
II  A continuous time version of the model
In this part we present how the two-period discrete OLG model is transformed to a
continuous-time model, on which the simulations in section 4 are based. In the
continuous-time model, the firms and the public sector are modeled in the same way as in
the two-period discrete OLG model. The models for consumer behaviour and the pension
fund are adapted as follows:
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1. Consumers
The model consists of overlapping generations of consumers.  Each year N young people
enter the economy and each year N people die. This means at each year, entries and
deaths exactly match and so the total population in the economy is constant over time.
Moreover, the young people enter the economy at the age of 25 and retire at the age of 65.
Therefore persons remain young for 40 years. And the persons die at the age 85. In this
case we know the ratio of the old to the young in the economy   follows from:
2
185
65
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Hence an increase in the age of death, other things constant, leads to a higher value of  .
The young persons, who participate in the labor market at a rate p ( 10 £< p ),  earn  a
real wage income tw , from which they contribute to the public sector and the pension
fund at rates gt and ptb )1( - , respectively. Net income then is spent on consumption and
asset accumulation. When old, the people do not work, but receive a public pension gh
and a pension ph  from the pension fund.14 A person  who enters  the  economy at  time v
therefore faces the following lifetime budget constraint at time 60+£nt .
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14 Actually, only those who have worked when young receive a pension, but in our aggregate analysis we
take that into account by including the participation rate.
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Here ),( svc is consumption at time s for  a  person  entering  at  time v and
duurstR
s
tò= )(),(  is the compound factor between t and s , where )(ur is the interest rate.
),( tvA is the asset of the person and ),( tvW
-
her human capital. For the young persons
( tvt ££- 40 ), ),( tvW
-
is the sum of the present value of after-pension premium wage in
the young period and the present value of pensions, see equation (A51a). For the old
persons ( 4060 -<£- tvt ) at time t, ),( tvW
-
is  the  present  value  of  pensions,  see
equation (A51b).
Thus the budget constraint (A51) states that lifetime consumption cannot exceed the
value of the human and financial capital.
Given the budget constraints (A51), individuals maximise the remaining lifetime utility.
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where r  measures the rate of time preference 15  and 0/1 >q is the elasticity of
intertemporal substitution. Maximising equation (A52) subject to the budget constraints
results in the following first-order condition
),()( )(),( stRts etesvc ---- = lrq                                                                                           (A53)
In this equation q-),( svc is the marginal utility of time s consumption,  and )(tl measures
the marginal utility of lifetime wealth.  But )(tl  for the young is different from the one
for  the  old  because  of  different  budget  constraints.   Equation  (A53)  shows  that
consumption is chosen at each time to equate the discounted marginal utilities of
consumption and lifetime wealth. Differentiating (A53) with respect to s , the
consumption Euler equation is derived.
15 The rate of time preference is 1.3% on a year basis. CPB(2007).
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From equation (A53), if ts =
ql
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By incorporating (A55) into (A53) we find
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Using equation (A58) and since for constant r we have R(t,s)=r(s-t):
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According to equation (A59), optimal consumption is proportional to total wealth.
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We have defined the human capital ),( tvW
-
 in equations (A51a) and (A51b), for young
and old , respectively. Below we will show how the asset ),( tvA is defined in equations
(A63) and (A65), for young and old, respectively.
Since a person enters the economy without financial wealth at vt = , it follows from (A59)
that
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From equation (A56) we know, assuming a constant r:
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The  Euler equation (A4) shows that
))((1
),(),(
vtr
evvctvc
--
=
r
q
in the young period
( 40+££ vtv ), so that we obtain:
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For the young generation 40+££ vtv ), asset accumulation follows:
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Where ),( tvc  is defined according to equation (A61).
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Thus assets for the young are given by equation (A63).
For the old generation ( 6040 +£<+ vtv ), asset accumulation follows:
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Solve ),( tvA using the same method mentioned above
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Thus assets for the old are given by equation (A65).
Then we can define savings as follows:
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2. Pension fund
Population is of size N , which is distributed uniformly over ages indicated by v  .The
pension fund has wealth ptW  at moment t,  it  receives  a  premium tv
p
tv pw ,,t  from workers
of age v  and pays out benefits ptv,h   to retirees of age v . The wealth is invested in equity
at return etr . Therefore, the pension fund wealth accumulates according to:
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We assume the premium rate pt   and wage w are the same for all ages of workers, that is
p
t
p
tv tt =,  and ttv ww =, . Similarly the benefit
ph is the same for all retirees, i.e. pt
p
tv hh =, .
Then we can simplify equation (A68) to:
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By paying a pension premium a young individual of age v  at moment t obtains a pension
right ptvl ,  The pension right is essentially an annuity which grows over time at rate
br . For,
individuals are only willing to participate in the pension fund when this guarantees them
a  return  on  assets  which  they  could  at  least  yield  themselves.  As  a  consequence,  the
young individual’s pension wealth yp tvL
,
,  accumulates as follows:
p
tv
yp
tv
b
t
yp
tv lLrL ,
,
,
,
, +=& 40+££ vtv             (A70)
50
For simplicity we assume the pension right to be identical for all age groups and constant
over time – hence pt
p
tv ll =, . From equation (A70) we can solve
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,
, , which yields:
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For  the  old  generation  the  individuals’  pension  wealth  is  the  accumulation  of  pension
rights minus the pension benefits that have been paid out. Therefore
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Similarly from equation (A72), we can solve op tvL
,
, , leading to:
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When benefits are constant over time, i.e. pptv hh =, . The starting value of
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,
,  is
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and the end value should be 0, 60, =+
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vvL . The latter implies:
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Then the sum of the individual’s pension wealth at moment t ( p tvL , ) is the liability of the
pension fund ptP .
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According to equation (A71), the liability for the young generation is equal to the
accumulated pension rights ( pl ) up to moment t. And according to equation (A73), the
liability for the old generation is equal to the accumulated pension rights in the young
period minus the pension benefits ( ph ) that have been paid.
Therefore, the pension liability of the pension fund is:
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Substituting  equation (A74) into equation (A76) yields:
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According to equations (A70) and (A72), the accumulated individual’s pension wealth
can be aggregated as:
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We assume the benefits ph  is  the  same  for  all  retirees  and  the  pension  rights pl  is the
same for all workers. Then we can simplify equation (A78) to:
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The accumulated liability of the pension fund is equal to the aggregated accumulated
individual’s pension wealth.
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With dvLNP
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t ò -= 60 , , equation (A80) can be written as:
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The accumulation of the wealth in the pension fund equals to the accumulation of the
liability in the pension fund, therefore does hold
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From equations (A69) and (A81) we then find
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In the steady state, the pension fund wealth ( pW ) equals to the pension fund liability
( pP ). Equation (A82) can be written as:
53
])(40[
40
1 pbepp PrrNl
Npw
--=t (A83)
Substituting equations (A74) and (A77) in equation (A83), we get:
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With pwpp xh =
When the accumulated wealth is not equal to the accumulated liability because of an
unexpected shock, the pension fund will adjust the premium according to:
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3. Simulation process:
With the equations derived in the previous two sections for the consumers and pension
fund and the equations in the paper for the firm and public sector, we can simulate the
model in the steady state and in the situation with shocks.
In the steady state, with equation (A84), (5) and (16), pension premium, wage and PAYG
tax rate can be calculated. Then according to equation (A59), consumption of young can
be calculated by aggregating the consumptions of 45 young generations. And
consumption  of  old  can  also  be  calculated  by  aggregating  the  consumptions  of  15  old
generations. Finally, the saving can be derived from equation (A66) and (A67), for young
and old, respectively.
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If the shock affects the pension fund, equation (A85) can be used to derive how the
pension premium is affected dynamically. With the dynamics of the pension premium
known, using equation A(59) the dynamics of consumption of young and consumption of
old can be derived. And the dynamics of saving can be derived according to equation
(A66) and (A67).
When  the  shock  affects  the  PAYG  pillar,  equation  (5)  can  be  used  to  derive  how  the
PAYG tax rate is affected dynamically. According to the dynamics of the PAYG tax rate,
the  dynamics  of  consumption  of  young and  consumption  of  old  can  be  concluded  with
equation (A59). Then the dynamics of saving can be concluded with equations (A66) and
(A67).
